ABSTRACT Function recognition is the preliminary step of the reverse analysis. It is the premise of binary reuse, generating control flow graphs, and performing semantic analysis. There are still many shortcomings in the application of current function identification tools, including cross-platform support, efficiency, and resource usage. To improve the accuracy and efficiency of function recognition in embedded system firmware, this paper proposes a new function recognition algorithm FRwithMBA based on the structure information. With the help of function call resolve, FRwithMBA identifies functions by determining the termination position of the function based on branches instruction and termination signatures of the function. In the experiment, we evaluated FRwithMBA against IDA Pro, radare2, and angr with the router binary Cisco IOS and found that FRwithMBA is more effective in identifying functions in the stripped binary under PPC and MIPS than the other tools. In terms of recognition effectiveness, FRwithMBA performs a little better than IDA Pro, but the results of radare2 and angr are poor. For a 14-MB binary, the parsing time of IDA Pro is 178 s, radare2 uses 376 s, angr uses 1896 s, and FRwithMBA uses 25 s. When processing 220-MB Executable and Linkable Format files, FRwithMBA can identify nearly 420 000 functions in about 240 s, IDA takes 2754 s, and both radare2 and angr get a fault. In the experiment, the recall of FRwithMBA reached 99.99% and the precision reached 99.7%. It is better than the other tools. In other words, FRwithMBA has more speed, higher accuracy, and less resource occupation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Binary analysis plays an important role in generating program control flows graph (CFG), exploiting vulnerabilities, detecting malicious code and backdoors, and so on. Firmware is a specific software that is embedded in the hardware, such as a router, a switch, or a camera. It controls the behavior of the device and manages the hardware. Extracting and analyzing the firmware running on the embedded devices and studying the vulnerability of and protection technology used on the embedded firmware are significant in reducing the attack. According to the origin of vulnerabilities and malicious code, there can be three types of vulnerabilities: 1) Introduced during coding. When designing and developing the programs, the programmer does not correctly handle the logic of the program or deliberately adds malicious code and backdoors. 2) Introduced during the compilation [1] . This type of vulnerability is caused by the design flaw of the compiler or when an attacker modifies the compiler. 3) Introduced during transmission. The program is implanted with malicious code or backdoor during the transmission over a network.
For example, the XcodeGhost event [2] occurred in September 2015. When IOS App is compiled with Xcode containing malicious programs, third-party malicious code can be injected into the app. Binary analysis can not only discover vulnerabilities generated by developers and malicious code or backdoors placed by attackers but also discover vulnerabilities or backdoors introduced by compilers or development tools. Stripped binaries [3] are executables that lack information about the locations, sizes, and layout of functions and objects. It is difficult to analyze stripped binary program without semantics, symbol table, and debugging-related information. What is more, it depends greatly on the knowledge of disassembly, reverse engineering, and other related expertise. However, a number of researchers are still trying to break through these difficulties. They have made many great achievements, too; for example, they have developed some excellent binary analysis tools, such as IDA Pro [4] , Jakstab [5] , angr [6] , BAP [7] , BitBlaze [8] , Triton [29] , and Binsec [30] , which help security researchers and enterprises discover vulnerabilities, backdoors, and malicious code in software.
Instruction set architecture (ISA) is an abstract concept of defining the nature of instructions in a computer. An ISA can be classified in a number of ways. Two common types of classification are by architectural complexity [9] : complex instruction set computer (CISC), for example, Intel x86/x86_64 families and Motorola M68000, and reduced instruction set computer (RISC), for example, Advanced RISC Machine (ARM) [10] , Performance Optimization With Enhanced RISC-Performance Computing (PPC) [11] , and Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipeline Stages (MIPS) [12] . RISC has the characteristics of convenient addressing, good scalability, low power consumption, and low price. It is widely used in embedded devices, such as routers, switches, firewalls, and Internet of Things (IoT). For the purpose of protecting intellectual property and core technologies, enterprises generally do not disclose the source code of firmware systems encapsulated in embedded devices. To study the security of embedded devices, researchers need to analyze the system firmware running on them. Security research on firmware of embedded devices mainly focuses on static reverse analysis at the binary level and virtualized simulation load analysis. Firmware that cannot be virtualized for simulation execution can only rely on binary analysis.
To our knowledge, the existing function recognition tools and algorithms are IDA Pro, BAP, radare2 [13] , Dyninst [14] , ByteWeight [15] , function recognition based on neural network [16] , and FID [28] . IDA Pro uses Fast Library Identification and Recognition Technology (F.L.I.R.T.) algorithm to quickly identify functions and libraries. F.L.I.R.T. utilizes recursive and signature matching to identify functions. It has high accuracy and applicability and supports many platforms. However, it has poor effectiveness in the recognition of indirect called function and the large embedded devices firmware. Both BAP and Dyninst apply pattern and signature matching algorithm to identify functions based on prior knowledge, such as in x86 ELF and PE binary, the start bytes of the function are 55 48 89 e5 (push %ebp; mov %esp, %ebp). The updated BAP adds some additional signatures to identify the function; however, these signatures rely on manual experience and need to be dynamically updated. What is more, it does not fully support to identify functions of stripped binary under PPC and MIPS. ByteWeight adopts a supervised machine-learning algorithm to generate a Weighted Prefix Tree aiding in the function recognition. After the training is completed, ByteWeight automatically generates signatures without relying on prior knowledge. It is highly accurate in function recognition and fast. Unfortunately, Bao et al. [15] just implemented the training test for the x86 binaries and did not implement under PPC/MIPS. For RISC, the applicability of this method is poor because of the diversity of function start instruction sequences, as shown in Section II. Shin et al. [16] proposed the application of neural networks to function recognition, using recurrent neural networks to improve the accuracy and efficiency of function recognition in stripped binary. Compared to current function recognition based on machine learning, this method has many advantages. Like ByteWeight, this method focuses on stripped binary in x86 platform and does not involve binary under PPC/MIPS. Wang et al. [28] proposed FID, a semantics-based method with machine learning, to recognize function in stripped binaries. FID can be applied to identify functions on binaries transformed by widely used obfuscation techniques.
The majority of existing binary analysis tools and algorithms concentrate mainly on x86/x86_64 stripped binaries without RISC. Some can analyze the firmware but cannot handle large embedded system firmware. When analyzing the Cisco IOS binaries with those tools, we found a series of problems, such as function recognition error, misinterpretation of the instruction into data, misinterpretation of the data into instruction, long parsing time, and large memory overhead, as shown in Figs. 1-3 .
The accurate identification of functions is the premise and basis for binary analysis. The generation of control flow graph [17] and the inference of execution path also depend on the accuracy of function recognition. For ameliorating the accuracy and efficiency of function recognition in large stripped binary, this paper presents a function recognition algorithm, FRwithMBA, based on structure information with Maximum Branch Address (MBA) and develops a function recognition tool for ELF stripped binary under PPC and MIPS. We evaluated FRwithMBA against IDA Pro, radare2, and angr with the router binary Cisco IOS. The experimental results demonstrate that this tool can accurately identify the functions of the large stripped binary with high speed and using small memory overhead. The contributions of this paper follow. 1. We analyzed the instruction and function characteristics of binary programs in Cisco router devices and proposed an algorithm to quickly identify the functions in stripped binary of embedded devices. 2. We designed and implemented FRwithMBA with python to identify functions in ELF. It supports function recognition in the stripped binary under the PPC and MIPS and output the starting address of the functions with virtual address mapping. 3. By comparing with existing binary analysis tools and algorithms, FRwithMBA algorithm showed the characteristics of higher speed, higher accuracy, and less overhead. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II introduces the related work on function signatures under PPC and MIPS. Section III presents the design and implementation of FRwithMBA. Section IV evaluates FRwithMBA with dataset by comparing with other binary analysis tools. Section V discusses this method. Section VI concludes this paper and reveals future work.
II. PROBLEM OVERVIEW
In this section, first we analyze the characteristics of the functions under PPC and MIPS ISA. Then, we describe the function identification problem and illustrate its challenges.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUNCTIONS UNDER PPC AND MIPS ISA
The x86 ISA provides opcodes such as push and pop to maintain the stack space. Function will operate the stack pointer at the beginning with push and pop. Most of the functions can be identified based on this signature. However, there is no similarity in opcode under PPC and MIPS. They maintain the stack space by increasing and decreasing the value of register with add and sub. In PPC, register r1 is invoked as the stack pointer and in MIPS, register r29 (also named as $sp) is used as the stack pointer, to keep the stack space. There are certain patterns in the initial instructions of most functions as shown in Figs. 4 and 5. In PPC, most of the functions have the same characteristics with fun1 and fun2 in Fig. 4 . The first instruction is stwu decreasing the value of r1 register. Then, the link register lr (the return address of function) is placed into r0 by the instruction mflr, and r0 is stored on the stack. At the end of the function, the return address is taken out from the stack and placed into r0 and the return value is written to the lr register by the instruction mtlr, the value of r1 is increased by the corresponding value, and finally the blr instruction returns to caller. Fig. 5 shows functions in the MIPS ISA. The first instruction of the function generally operates on the stack pointer r29 ($sp) register and adds the negative value to the value of $sp to allocate stack space for current function. Then, the value of the r31 ($ra) register that holds the return address of the function call is stored into the stack through the sw instruction.
At the end of the function, the return address stored in the stack is first loaded into the $ra register, and then jr $ra instruction is executed to return to the father function to continue execution. After that, the addiu command adds a positive value to $sp. Since the branch instruction of the MIPS processor occupies more clock cycles, to improve the efficiency, a branch delay slot is designed. Generally, the operation of restoring the stack space is placed after the jr $ra instruction. However, not all of the functions have the above characteristics. There are some special cases, as shown in Fig. 6 (a) : the first instruction of fun5 is mr. r9, r3, in (b), the first instruction of fun6 is lwz r9, 0(r3), in (c), the first instruction of fun7 is lw $a0, 4($a0), and in (d), the first instruction of fun8 is bnez $a0, loc_138, which are ordinary instructions and can exist in everywhere. Those functions do not apply for stack space to store variables without changing the stack pointer. It is difficult to extract common signatures for such functions.
B. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Function recognition is to identify a series of functions in the binary with the Function Identification Algorithm (FIA). It is very simple to identify the function in the binary containing the debugging information, such as the symbol table. In the Linux binary program, symbol table provides the mapping information between function name and address, and so is the program database (PDB) in the Windows PE binary. For embedded devices, the device manufacturer usually provides only the release version of firmware. The firmware does not contain any information about function starting address. The reverse analysis of firmware is an enormous challenge in the absence of those information.
In the stripped binaries, the function recognition problem is how to accurately and efficiently aggregate a single instruction to form a set of instructions, a function, output starting address, and the boundary range with FIA.
Input: Instructions sequence B in ELF under the PPC or MIPS platform.
Output: A collection of functions arranged in descending order of virtual address mapping
The number of functions is n, and the function is f i . The set of starting addresses is S(n) = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . , s n }, and s i = Min(f i ). The set of termination address is E(n) = {e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , . . . , e n }, and e i = Max(f i ). The boundary range is R(n) = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , . . . , r n }.
Definition 1: The Function Start Identification (FSI) [15] problem is to find the set of starting addresses for a series of n functions S(n) = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . , s n } given a RISC stripped binary without source code.
Definition 2: The Function Identification problem is to find the set of all of the functions F(n) = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , . . . , f n } given a RISC stripped binary without source code.
Since both PPC and MIPS are RISC, each instruction has a length of 4 bytes (32 bits), then the offset of each instruction is 4. The starting address of the current function is s i , then the starting address of the next function is s i + 4m (m is the number of instructions in the current function).
C. CHALLENGE 1) FUNCTION IS NOT CALLED OR INDIRECTLY CALLED
During the development of the software, there are some library functions that are designed, but not called by any function at the end, and some functions are called by register values or other methods. Therefore, the function call resolve (FRC) can only recognize those functions that appear on the control flow path, but miss those that have never been called or are called indirectly.
2) DIVERSITY OF FUNCTION START INSTRUCTIONS
Due to the different features of functions, there are different local variables, so the starting instruction is different in different functions. For example, in the PPC, the starting instructions of the function have stwu r1, −0x10(r1), mr. r3, r3,li r3, 0, and so on. If we rely only on the signatures of the function to identify functions, we need to manually collect a large number of signatures. In addition, instructions with such signatures are not exactly the starting instructions of the function.
3) FUNCTION HAS MULTIPLE RETURN BRANCHES
Some functions have more than one return instruction in different branches. If only the function return instruction is utilized to judge whether the function ends, causing the current function to be inaccurately recognized, and the remaining branches will be mistakenly recognized as functions.
4) LACK OF SYMBOL TABLE AND DEBUG INFORMATION
In the release version of the software and system firmware, symbol table and debugging information have been removed VOLUME 6, 2018 to protect property. So, lacking relevant information, we cannot directly determine the entry point address of the function.
5) LACK OF SOURCE CODE OF FIRMWARE
For security and intellectual property reasons, enterprises rarely disclose the source code of the firmware used in embedded devices, as well as the compiler optimization option configuration used when cross-compiling [28] . There are a number of differences between firmware compiled for embedded devices and desktop programs. Due to the lack of the above information and source code, we can only rely on the reverse analysis and experience. However, relying only on manual analysis to identify these functions is not realistic in practical applications.
III. FUNCTION RECOGNITION WITH FRwithMBA
To address the problem mentioned above, this paper proposes FRwithMBA, based on structure information, which aims at identifying and analyzing functions in firmware under PPC and MIPS ISA. With this method, function identification problem can be converted into the judgment of the termination of the function. The algorithm determines the termination position of the function based on the jump branch instructions appearing in the binary and the termination signatures of functions and recognizes function combining with FCR.
In this section, we describe the design and implementation of FRwithMBA in detail to solve the function identification problem in stripped binaries of embedded devices.
A. FUNCTION RECOGNITION WITH MAXIMUM BRANCH ADDRESS
The function that is called directly can be identified by FCR, but the function that is not called or called indirectly cannot be recognized by using FCR. The key to function recognition is how to identify such functions.
After analyzing a number of firmware, we find the following basics: Firmware of embedded device generally uses a RISC, for example, PPC and MIPS. The function in stripped binary of embedded devices is generally continuous in the memory space [23] , that is, there is no branch of another function in the middle of a continuous function. Only when there is a switch branch, there is a partial branch jump table in the code segment. There is no code encryption in the code segment. The signatures of the function termination are not as complicated as the starting instruction. The termination instructions are blr, rfi, bctr and so on under PPC, jr, and eret under MIPS. According to the FCR, the destination address of the function call is the starting address of a new function. Based on the above premise, we designed the FRwithMBA algorithm, which is based on linear scanning. From the first instruction to the end of the executable code segment, the entire recognition process only scans once with fast and efficient features.
Starting from the first instruction of code segment, it is recorded as the starting address of the first function. In the process of parsing the instruction, MBA is constructed to record the maximum distance of the branch. The destination address of the function call instruction is directly added to the function starting address collection.
The pseudocode of FRwithMBA is presented in Table 1 .
Input: the instruction sequence B in ELF under PPC/MIPS.
Output: the starting address of functions FRwithMBA was divided into five stages.
1) Before the function recognition starts, the algorithm initializes the variable parameters includes function set, MBA, and termination flag. 2) Function recognition starts, and each time one instruction is fetched from instruction sequence B. 3) Based on the virtual address mapping, it is determined whether the address of the current instruction is within the range of branch jump. If current address is larger than the MBA and the previous instruction is a function termination instruction, the current address is added to the function starting address set. 4) Parse the instruction at the current address with capstone [24] , and the instructions are divided into four categories: function call, branch, function termination, and other instructions. For function call, the target address to be called is a function and directly is added to the set of starting address and the branch target address table with labeling function call. For branch instruction, the branch target address is compared with the MBA to get the current MBA. The branch instruction is divided into conditional branch and unconditional branch. The unconditional branch is b branch under PPC and is j branch under MIPS. The target of b and j can be a branch or a function, so it is necessary to determine whether it is a branch or a function. In this paper, we use the signatures of instruction before or after the b and j branch. If the function ends, it will restore the stack space with addiu instruction. For example, after j instruction, there is an instruction addiu $sp, 0xA0. Another judgment is the distance l between the current address and the target address. If the distance l is larger than the threshold m, we mark the target address as the starting address of a new function. However, it is hard to set the threshold m; when m is too large, some functions will be missed; when m is too small, some branches will be identified as functions. Through the above two methods, it can help identify some functions, but the second method is not always accurate. When meeting a function termination instruction, the function termination flag is marked as the judgment condition of the next function. 5) Continue to fetch instruction from instruction sequence B and parse it.
B. RUNNING EXAMPLE
Next, we illustrate how FRwithMBA works with some specific examples. As shown in Fig. 7 , the starting instructions of fun9 are beqz $a0 and locret_870, and it has two return instructions jr $ra. So, it is hard to identify this function with the pattern recognition from the starting instruction. However, for FRwithMBA, it can accurately identify this function. Assuming the last function has been accurately found, now what needs to be done is trying to locate the termination instruction for this function. From the first instruction, we know this function has a branch locret_870 in line 5. When the algorithm meets jr $ra, it marks the termination flag as return and go on. When the FRwithMBA analyzes the instruction in line 5, it knows line 5 is a branch of fun9, marks the termination flag and continues to scan. Since line 5 also is jr $ra, a return instruction, termination flag is marked. When scans at line 1 of fun10, it finds that this address is larger than MBA instruction; so the fun9 is over and it is the starting address of a new function. It has accurately identified fun9 and starts to identify fun10. Fig. 8 shows the function with multiple branches under MIPS. We now explain how FRwithMBA works on a function with multiple branches. FRwithMBA will maintain the MBA when scanning and parsing the instruction. When meeting this first branch blez $v1, loc_300008DC, the MBA is set to 300008DC and then meets the second branch bnez $a1, loc_300008C8. In turn, the next are bnez $a0, loc_300008C8, j loc_300008DC, and bnez $v0,loc_30000874. Fig. 9 shows the change of MBA. At jr $ra, the termination flag is marked. Then, at 0x300008DC+8 (delay slot), it is larger than 300008DC, so it does not belong to sub_3000083C, then it is the starting instruction of a new function.
FRwithMBA does not depend on the starting signature of the function; so it can recognize functions without significant starting signatures and can effectively solve the existence of multiple termination instructions and functions that are not called directly.
C. SYSTEM DESIGN
We design a binary analysis system with FRwithMBA. The system can be divided into three stages: preprocessing stage, VOLUME 6, 2018 FRwithMBA stage, and output stage. Next, we describe each stage in detail. Fig. 10 shows the process of function recognition with FRwithMBA. Fig. 11 presents the detail process of FRwithMBA when dealing with the instruction in MIPS ISA.
1) PREPROCESSING STAGE
Based on the ELF binary file format [25] , the processor type and instruction set are first identified. Then the offset and size of the executable code segment are obtained, and the range of the code segment is calculated. Next, the ELF binary is loaded and converted into instruction sequence B in hexadecimal.
2) FRWITHMBA STAGE
Since PPC and MIPS are RISC and each instruction is 4 bytes, the hexadecimal instruction sequence is segmented to obtain a single ordered set of instructions. Then, a virtualized memory mapping for the instruction set is constructed and the function recognition with linear scan is started. For every function, the FRwithMBA maintains the MBA. Fig. 8 presents the detailed process of FRwithMBA when parsing the instruction mentioned in Section III A.
3) OUTPUT STAGE
According to the order with the virtual address mapping, the starting address of functions is written into the file for subsequent analysis and comparison.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss our experiments and evaluate FRwithMBA. FRwithMBA is implemented in Python, supports PPC and MIPS architecture. So far, we have mainly analyzed ELF stripped binaries of routers, and we have not analyzed other format binaries. The dependency libraries, for example, capstone and pyelftools, are then installed, which can run under Linux, Windows, and Mac OS. First, we introduce the environment and the dataset and then show the result of FRwithMBA compared with other binary analysis tools. Finally, we analyze the results and discuss the performance of FRwithMBA.
A. ENVIRONMENT
In the experiment, we use a desktop machine to execute FRwithMBA and other tools. The configuration is as follows: Intel R Core TM 6-core 3.7 GHz i7-8700K CPU and 32GB RAM. Some tools such as ByteWeight only implement the function recognition in x86 or x86-64 binaries, but not fully support PPC/MIPS ISA, so the comparison cannot be performed. We also tried to use the latest version 1.4 BAP to load and parse the IOS with API ''bap.run()'' and got failure. So, we finally chose to use the latest version IDA Pro, radare2, and angr to compare with FRwithMBA. The version of IDA Pro used in the experiment is the latest version 7.0.170914 Windows x64 (32-bit address size), the latest version of radare2 is 2.6.0, and the latest version of angr is 7.8.7.1 with commit 94cab09.
B. DATASET SELECTED
The security of devices, such as routers and switches, is of paramount importance. Cisco routers occupy a large market share [26] . The dataset we use here is Cisco IOS. Cisco IOS has tens of thousands of versions and two architectures, PPC and MIPS. In addition, Cisco IOS is a network operating system in one single binary; so its size is relatively large. The latest version is 15.7(3)M2 and its size reached 220 MB after decompression. To evaluate FRwithMBA, we selected 10 binaries under PPC and 10 binaries under MIPS, respectively, with different size. We use IDA Pro, radare2, angr, and FRwithMBA to identify the functions in Cisco IOS.
C. EFFECTIVENESS OF FRwithMBA
The experimental results are shown in Tables 2-4. The ''Fault'' in the table indicates that there is a segmentation fault when identifying the function.
The IDA Pro refers to the result of automatically identifying using only IDA Pro. IDAPython shows the result of using the IDAPython after IDA Pro. radare2 is the result of paring with ''aaa'' command in radare2, and angr is the result of function recognition using ''CFGFast()'' in angr. FRwithMBA is the result of identification using the FRwithMBA algorithm. As we can see from the tables, the function numbers identified by IDAPython and FRwithMBA are similar. While the radare2 recognizes the fewest functions, and the angr recognizes the largest functions. Simply comparing the function numbers among them cannot present whether the algorithm is good or not. Thus, the output is changed into one format and the starting addresses of all of the recognized functions are compared with each other using UltraCompare. We discuss the analysis in Section IV E in detail.
In the experiment, both radare2 and angr take up a lot of memory resource and time. When parsing about 20 MB IOS binary, the memory usage reaches 15 GB, and the 80 MB file reaches 27 GB with CFGFast() of angr. When radare2 uses the ''aaa'' command to identify the functions, there are also problems with memory overhead.
D. ACCURACY AND PERFORMANCE
For a more accurate assessment, we selected two test files for manual reverse analysis and obtained more than 60,000 functions. The experimental results are shown in Table 4 . We evaluate our algorithm with precision and recall [15] . As Bao et al. [15] shows, precision reflects the number of times an identified function start is really a function start. A high precision means that most identified functions are indeed functions. Recall is to describe how many functions were identified with a binary. A high recall means most functions are recognized. Mathematically, they can be expressed as:
Recall: r = |TP| |TP| + |FN | . Table 5 shows the precision and recall of four FSI tools. For the test ELF binaries of Cisco router, FRwithMBA has both precision and recall above 99%, while the recall of IDA 7.0 is about 92% in PPC and the precision is above 99%. radare2 has a high precision but low recall, while angr has a low precision but high recall. However, the function starting identification tools not only should have high precision but also should have high recall. Figs. 12 and 13 show the relationship between file size and executing time under PPC and MIPS. The time consumption varies linearly with the size of the binary file and it is suitable for analysis large file in ELF format under PPC and MIPS. Actually, FRwithMBA only needs to maintain an MBA to identify functions in stripped binary. Since our goal is to develop an embedded firmware analysis tool, we construct the branch target address jump table to generate CFG and implement other features.
We used two binaries to evaluate the performance of different binary analysis tools. Table 6 shows the executing time of IDA Pro, radare2, angr, and FRwithMBA. During function recognition, these tools may have some other features in the process of function recognition, such as generating CFG. In the experiment, for a 14 MB binary, the parsing time of IDA Pro is 178 s, radare2 uses 376 s, angr uses 1896 s, and FRwithMBA uses 25 s. For a 220 MB binary, the IDA Pro resolution time is 2754 s, while the FRwithMBA is 241 s, but radare2 and angr cannot handle such a large binary.
E. ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT
Figs. 14 and 15 show the comparison results of IDA Pro, angr, radare2, and FRwithMBA. From the comparison, it can be seen that the identification results of this part of IDA Pro and FRwithMBA are consistent, function 0x8000b220 is identified by angr. As shown in Fig. 15 , Tables 2 and 3 , radare2 misses a lot of functions and angr identifies some branches into functions during function recognition.
From Fig. 16 , we can know that the instruction at 0x8000B21C is a branch beqlr. So 0x8000B220 is not the starting address of function. It is identified mistakenly by angr. that IDA Pro identified a function at 0x30019440 and FRwithMBA identified a function at 0x30019820.
As shown in Fig. 18 at 0x30019440, significantly it is a branch instruction at 0x3001943C, it should not be identified as a function at 0x30019440.
Another difference between IDA Pro and FRwithMBA is at 0x30019820. By using the cross-reference function of IDA Pro, it is found that 0x30019820 is called by two functions sub_3001446c and sub_3001460C with unconditional branch. After the unconditional branch, the stack is restored by addiu $sp, 0x28. Thus, it is more appropriate to identify 30019820 as a new function. Fig. 19 shows the result of IDA Pro when identifying the function with unconditional branch.
By comparing the output results of IDA Pro, radare2, angr, and FRwithMBA algorithm above, it is found that the FRwithMBA has the best effectiveness in identifying the function of embedded stripped binary among them, followed by IDA Pro; radare2 misses a lot of functions, and angr has a large number of recognition errors. In addition, FRwithMBA spends less time in identifying functions with linear scan and the executing time is linear with the size of stripped binary.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the effect of unconditional jump branches, jump tables of switch instruction data in .text and code obfuscation on the accuracy of function recognition.
A. UNCONDITIONAL BRANCH
To judge the influence of the unconditional branch on the function recognition, we extract the unconditional jump instruction of 10 test files. As shown in Table 7 , the proportion of function in unconditional branch is relatively small. As mentioned in Section III A, to solve the problem of unconditional jump, we use two kinds of judgment: 1) before or after unconditional branch, whether there is an operation on stack pointer, and 2) the distance between the destination address of the unconditional branch target and the current address. It is found that when there is an instruction operation, the stack pointer before or after the unconditional branch, the target is a function. However, for the second condition, it is not as accurate as the first one. In general, when the deviation is large, the accuracy in identifying a function is considered to be higher.
B. JUMP TABLE
When the compiler compiles a switch statement with many branches, it generates a branch jump table for it. Cifuentes and Emmerik [27] proposed how to restore branch jump tables. The branch jump table is stored in the .text code segment or the data segment, .rodata segment as shown in Fig. 20 . When implementing FRwithMBA, we only processed the executable code segment .text of the stripped binary and did not parse the .rodata segment. Therefore, there will be a case where the branch of the switch jump is recognized as a function. In the binary, if the switch branch needs to be identified, it is necessary to determine whether each instruction is a load data segment address instruction and then determine whether the data of the address here is a branch jump address table. In addition, the switch branch is only a small part of the program, and not all switches generate branch jump tables after compilation. Finally, we sacrifice the accuracy of this part of the function recognition to improve the efficiency of function recognition.
C. DATA IN .text
There will be some data in the .text segment between functions which interfere in function identification. To solve this problem, we will first try to transfer the four bytes into instruction. If it is an instruction, it will be identified as the function start address; otherwise, it will be treated as data and parse the next four bytes. 
D. OBFUSCATION
There will be code confusing [19] - [22] and other technologies in the embedded device firmware [28] . FRwithMBA is mainly based on the function structure and the function termination signature. So, as long as the obfuscation does not destroy the function structure and termination signature, it is able to solve the obfuscation mentioned in [28] , for example, inserting ''nop'' instruction in the function starting.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose FRwithMBA, an algorithm for automatically identifying functions without debugging information and symbol table. In the experiment, we selected Cisco IOS as the dataset, and tested the algorithm under PPC and MIPS architecture. We found that most binary analysis tools rarely support large embedded device firmware, the operating efficiency is very low, and it occupies more resources, such as the memory occupied by angr when generating a CFG map for a 23 MB ELF file can be up to 15 GB. In the actual processing, such a large memory occupation is unacceptable. Comparing the output results of IDA Pro, radare2, and angr tools, we found that FRwithMBA algorithm is more effective in identifying functions in the stripped binary under PPC and MIPS, and the executing time is shorter. When processing 220M ELF files, FRwithMBA can identify nearly 420,000 functions in about 240 s, and IDA takes 2754 s because it needs to be fully parsed, and both radare2 and angr get a fault. In the experiment, the recall of FRwithMBA reached 99.99% and the precision reached 99.7%. It is better than other tools, so the FRwithMBA is much more suitable for identifying functions in large stripped binary under PPC and MIPS.
In the future, we will design a cross-platform tool to analyze the stripped binary of embedded devices, including generating CFG and data flow graphs (DFG) and extracting calling relationships for sensitive functions and parameters, in addition to optimizing the efficiency of the algorithm and reducing memory overhead.
